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Opt-in	vs.	Opt-out	=	opt-in-opt-out?	On	the	activation	of	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction	over	the	crime	of	aggression		
	In	December	2017,	the	States	Parties	to	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	had	the	chance	to	realize	in	New	York	what	Robert	H.	Jackson	called	for	in	his	opening	statement	before	the	International	Military	Tribunal	in	Nuremberg.	While	international	criminal	law	was	 only	 applied	 against	 German	 aggressors	 at	 that	 time,	 the	 U.S.	 Chief	 Prosecutor	emphasized	that	the	condemnation	of	aggressive	war	should	be	the	benchmark	for	any	other	nation	in	the	future.	When	states	laid	down	the	foundations	of	the	ICC	in	1998,	they	listed	the	crime	of	aggression	as	one	of	the	crimes	under	the	Court’s	jurisdiction.	Although	States	Parties	agreed	on	a	definition	of	the	crime	of	aggression	and	the	conditions	for	the	Court’s	exercise	of	jurisdiction		at	the	2010	Kampala	Conference,	it	took	another	seven	years	before	they	activated	the	Court’s	jurisdiction.	This	article	sheds	light	on	the	most	controversial	issue	prior	to	activation	and	explains	the	content	as	well	as	the	effects	of	the	resolution	as	adopted	by	the	Assembly	of	States	Parties	(ASP).			
The	remaining	controversy	with	regard	to	non-ratifying	States	Parties		
	States	were	divided	on	the	following,	very	technical	question:	In	case	of	state	referrals	
or	proprio	motu	 investigations,	 does	 the	 ICC	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 nationals	 of	
States	Parties	that	have	not	ratified	or	accepted	the	aggression	amendments	and	
that	did	not	make	an	opt-out	declaration?	Intuitively,	international	lawyers	would	say	“no”.	 Treaty	 amendments	 cannot	 bind	 a	 state	 without	 its	 consent.	 But	 this	 does	 not	answer	the	question	whether	active	consent	(by	accepting/ratifying	the	amendments)	or	passive	consent	(by	not	making	an	opt-out	declaration)	is	required.	Several	states,	the	so-called	opt-in	camp,	argued	that	active	consent	by	the	aggressor	and	the	victim	state	was	necessary.	Why?	According	to	the	plain	meaning	of	the	second	sentence	of	Article	121(5)	ICC	 Statute,	 the	 ICC	 shall	 not	 exercise	 jurisdiction	 regarding	 a	 crime	 covered	 by	 an	amendment	unless	the	state	of	nationality	and	the	state	of	territoriality	have	opted	in	by	accepting/ratifying	the	amendments.	This	sentence	seems	to	establish	an	opt-in	system	in	case	a	new	crime	is	added	to	the	Court’s	jurisdiction.	The	opt-out	camp	tried	to	rebut	these	allegations.	Whereas	any	new	crime	(e.g.	terrorism)	needs	to	fulfill	all	requirements	of	Article	121(5),	this	cannot	hold	true	for	the	crime	of	aggression	which	is	already	listed	in	Article	5(1)	as	a	crime	under	the	Court’s	 jurisdiction.	 In	addition,	 the	application	of	Article	 121(5)	 second	 sentence	 would	 conflict	 with	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 Kampala	compromise:	To	bridge	 the	gap	between	 those	 that	did	not	require	 the	 consent	of	 the	aggressor	state	(Article	12(2)(a))	and	others	that	emphasized	its	importance,	delegates	established	 an	 opt-out	 system	 (Article	 15bis(4)).	 Accordingly,	 the	 Court	 can	 exercise	jurisdiction	over	a	crime	of	aggression	committed	by	nationals	of	a	State	Party,	unless	the	aggressor	state	has	previously	revoked	its	consent	by	opting	out.	Thus,	States	agreed	on	a	consent-based	regime,	but	they	decided	that	passive	consent	sufficiently	respects	the	interests	of	 aggressor	 states.	 The	 opt-out	 regime	would	 lose	 its	 character	 as	 a	middle	ground	if	it	was	combined	with	the	opt-in	clause	of	Article	121(5).	States	could	shield	their	aggressive	 leaders	 twice,	 by	 not	 ratifying	 the	 amendments	 and	 by	 opting	 out	 after	ratification.			
Establishment	 of	 an	 opt-in-opt-out	 system	 but	 reaffirmation	 of	 judicial	
independence		
	
In	 the	 end,	 it	 was	 not	 the	 power	 of	 legal	 arguments	 but	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 indefinite	postponement	of	the	activation	decision	that	led	to	the	adoption	of	the	resolution,	which	is	mainly	based	on	the	opt-in	regime.	Paragraph	2	reflects	almost	verbatim	Article	121(5)	second	sentence	by	stating	that	the	Court	shall	not	exercise	its	jurisdiction	regarding	a	crime	of	aggression	when	committed	by	a	national	or	on	the	territory	of	a	State	Party	that	has	 not	 ratified	 or	 accepted	 these	 amendments.	 If	 one	 perceives	 the	 resolution	 as	subsequent	 agreement	 or	 practice	 (Article	 31(3)	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	Treaties),	the	combined	reading	with	Article	15bis(4)	leads	to	an	opt-in-opt-out	system.	Good	 news	 for	 all	 states	 that	 change	 their	mind	 after	 ratification.	 There	would	 be	 an	emergency	exit	in	case	they	decide	to	attack	other	countries	after	ratification.	Bad	news	for	 the	35	states	 that	expected	 judicial	protection	after	ratification.	Except	 for	Security	Council	referrals,	their	aggression	case	against	non-ratifying	States	Parties	could	not	be	brought	before	 the	 ICC.	End	of	 story?	Well,	 the	 resolution	 still	 leaves	 some	 leeway	by	reaffirming	 judicial	 independence	 (paragraph	 3).	 In	 case	 the	 resolution	 remains	ambiguous	as	to	the	scope	of	jurisdiction,	it	is	up	to	the	Court	to	decide,	see	Article	119(1).	Indeed,	 it	 is	 quite	 contradictory	 to	 establish	 an	 opt-in	 regime	 while	 “noting	 with	appreciation	the	Report	on	the	facilitation”	which	summarizes	the	views	of	States	Parties,	including	those	supporting	the	opt-out	camp.	Nonetheless,	it	will	be	hard	to	justify	that	the	 pure	 opt-out	 system	 of	 Article	 15bis(4)	 still	 applies	 despite	 the	 clear	 wording	 of	paragraph	2	of	the	resolution.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	a	slim	chance	that	subsequent	state	conduct	might	reveal	a	persisting	controversy	that	needs	to	be	settled	by	the	Court.	The	 subtle	 objections	 States	 Parties	 expressed	 after	 adoption	 might	 serve	 as	 a	 first	indication.	States	could	further	strengthen	the	impression	of	disagreement	by	declaring	a	temporary	 opt-out	 until	 they	 ratify	 the	 amendments.	 This	 seemingly	 schizophrenic	conduct	would	help	to	reaffirm	the	pure	opt-out	regime	as	the	prevailing	one	despite	the	formal	adoption	of	 the	opt-in	 clause.	Their	opt-out	declaration	would	suggest	 that	 the	default	 rule	 is	 acceptance	 (Article	 15(4)).	 If	 states	 fail	 to	 engage	 in	 common	 conduct,	paragraph	2	of	the	resolution	cannot	be	seen	as	establishing	subsequent	state	practice.	Be	that	as	 it	may,	 time	will	 tell	whether	the	paragraph	on	 judicial	 independence	will	ever	become	a	powerful	 tool	 for	 the	Court.	At	 the	ASP,	however,	 its	 inclusion	was	 rather	a	means	to	placate	the	opt-out	camp	and	to	reach	consensus.		
The	potential	impact	of	the	resolution		In	case	paragraph	2	is	perceived	as	a	subsequent	agreement,	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction	will	be	further	restricted	in	case	of	state	referrals	and	proprio	motu	investigations,	namely,	both	the	aggressor	and	the	victim	state	need	to	ratify	before	the	ICC	can	exercise	jurisdiction.	If	the	number	of	ratifications	does	not	increase,	these	two	trigger	mechanisms	will	only	play	a	minor	role	in	combatting	aggression.	Instead,	referrals	by	the	Security	Council	will	gain	in	importance.	Contrary	to	States	Parties	and	the	Prosecutor,	the	Security	Council	can	trigger	the	Court’s	jurisdiction	even	if	Non-States	Parties	or	non-ratifying	States	Parties	are	involved	(Article	15ter).	The	adopted	opt-in	clause	does	not	only	reduce	the	number	of	potential	aggression	cases	from	conflicts	between	122	States	Parties	(Kenya	opted	out)	to	35	ratifying	States	Parties.	 Indirectly,	 it	also	reduces	the	Court’s	autonomy	from	the	Security	Council	as	its	exercise	of	jurisdiction	over	non-ratifying	States	Parties	would	fully	depend	on	a	Security	Council	referral.	Ironically,	the	permanent	members	already	called	for	 the	Council’s	exclusivity	 to	 trigger	the	Court’s	 jurisdiction	 in	Kampala.	Seven	years	later,	 States	 Parties	 did	 not	 establish	 exclusivity,	 but	 they	 adopted	 a	 resolution	 that	
potentially	produces	the	same	effect	if	the	number	of	ratifications	does	not	increase.	The	condemnation	of	aggressive	war	will	be	a	benchmark	for	any	other	non-ratifying	nation,	but	only	if	the	Security	Council	so	decides.	
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